When Silence Speaks: What the Court’s Pass on Student Speech Reveals
By refusing to hear a student speech case, the Court left unclear whether unpopular biological or political beliefs still qualify as protected expression in public schools.
This week, the United States Supreme Court declined to hear Morrison v. Middleborough Public Schools, a case concerning a student prohibited from wearing a shirt that stated, “There Are Only Two Genders.” The decision not to grant certiorari is procedurally unremarkable. Yet in a moment of deep national debate over the boundaries of discourse, identity, and institutional neutrality, it represents a missed opportunity for clarity.
The facts are straightforward and undisputed. Liam Morrison, a middle school student in Massachusetts, wore a shirt bearing a simple and biologically rooted assertion. It was neither vulgar nor threatening. He was removed from class, and his expression was deemed to have violated the school’s policy against speech that “targets” protected groups. The litigation that followed challenged this rationale on First Amendment grounds.
The Doctrinal Context
Since Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), it has been well established that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” But Tinker also permits restrictions when speech materially and substantially disrupts the work and discipline of the school. Courts have since struggled to define the contours of this disruption standard, particularly when the claimed harm is not disorder but offense.
In declining to revisit these boundaries in Morrison, the Court leaves intact a lower court’s reasoning that may permit suppression of student speech based solely on perceived emotional harm, even where there is no evidence of actual disruption. This outcome invites ambiguity regarding the extent to which schools may enforce ideological conformity under the guise of maintaining order.
Cultural Orthodoxy and Constitutional Minimalism
There is a deeper concern at play. The refusal to review this case signals, whether intentionally or not, a toleration of viewpoint discrimination within state institutions. The student’s expression was not inflammatory by any traditional legal standard. That it was nonetheless deemed punishable suggests a shifting paradigm, in which prevailing cultural norms—particularly those surrounding gender ideology—acquire quasi-official status in public education.
While the Court’s role is not to resolve every cultural conflict, its silence in the face of emerging patterns of censorship leaves lower courts, school administrators, and families without clear guidance. In moments of moral and cultural contestation, constitutional interpretation does not occur in a vacuum. The doctrines of neutrality and equal protection for speech require careful stewardship, particularly when expressive rights come into tension with evolving institutional norms.
A Moment Not Seized
To be clear, denying certiorari does not imply endorsement. The Court declines hundreds of petitions each year for reasons unrelated to merit. But in this instance, the underlying issues are neither isolated nor minor. They touch on the scope of the First Amendment in a rapidly changing public square, and on whether students may express traditional or dissenting views in a respectful manner without sanction.
This case was not about whether the student was right. It was about whether he had the right. The jurisprudential opportunity here was not to weigh in on gender, but to reassert that civil liberties are not contingent on alignment with dominant cultural narratives.
In the absence of such reaffirmation, the risk is not merely confusion. It is erosion. When public institutions adopt ideological boundaries for permissible expression, they cease to function as neutral forums. Over time, the constitutional protections that once served as guardrails for pluralism may instead become instruments for gatekeeping.
The Court may well take up a similar case in the near future. If it does, it will face a question that transcends this particular controversy: Will the First Amendment continue to protect unpopular truths as rigorously as it protects popular ones?
That, increasingly, is the constitutional question at the heart of the culture war.